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Summary 
The work that appears in this publication was written by the 
philosopher Amelia Valcárcel and presented at the panel on Equity 
and Human Rights held in conjunction with the VIII Regional 
Conference on Women in Latin America and the Caribbean (Lima, 
Peru, 8-10 February 2000). 
 
The collective memory and the challenges of feminism are 
reflected in the author’s review of feminist political philosophy from 
the Enlightenment to the present day. She addresses the classic themes 
of equality and examines the sources that have given rise to much of 
the current contention between men and women. 
 
This brief and disciplined text examines the process by which 
the feminism of the Enlightenment was able to formulate its demands 
at the political level; the relationship of feminism to the building of 
democracy and the conditions under which it was possible to bring 
about legislative and educational changes; the second wave, 
represented by suffragism, at the time of World War I; the third wave, 
in the 1970s, and the challenges for the new millennium. 
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I. The first wave 
By emphasizing the role of the Enlightenment in the origins of 
feminism, I intend to make a distinction between political feminist 
literature, on the one hand, and another train of thought, also polemic, that 
has cropped up recurrently in European history since the thirteenth 
century. At the dawn of the early Middle Ages, at the time of the birth and 
spread of Gothic city life and early medieval forms of civilization, an 
entirely new set of ways and ideas was born which may be summed up by 
the term gallantry. In that context a particular form of literature emerged – 
I will refer to it as “discourse on the excellence of noble women” – which 
was cultivated by both men and women and unquestionably had its social 
uses. It served to provide models of female conduct and reinforce the self-
esteem of women in the noble castes. By referring to queens, heroines, 
female saints, and other great women of the past, it offered models of 
femininity that contributed to the creation of gallantry among the group in 
power. However, this discourse on the excellence of women did not go 
unchallenged: it was paralleled by a misogynous literature of remote 
origins, usually promoted by the clergy but sometimes also by lay authors. 
The discourse on the excellence of women and the misogynous discourse 
competed with one another in an almost ritualised performance up until 
the Baroque period. The one exalted the feminine virtues and qualities and 
cited women as examples, while the other, with origins that went back to 
the Fathers of the Church and even to Aristotle, harped relentlessly on the 
supposed shortcomings and inherent stupidity of the female sex. 
Philogynists and misogynists kept repeating the same examples and 
arguments without ever coming to agreement, or perhaps never intending 
to, in an endless debate. However, they both shared, and neither of them 
ever challenged, the premise that women had to be under the authority of 
men; they differed only on the respect that should be accorded to them. 
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Feminism and the Enlightenment. The first wave 
Feminism is radically different from the “discourse on the excellence of women.” It is a line 
of political thought that is typical of the Enlightenment: in the context of the development of 
modern political philosophy, feminism has emerged as the most important and profound correction 
to primitive democratism. It is not a discourse on the excellence of women, but rather one based on 
the notion of equality that informs the discussions which surround this school of political thought. 
The founding work of feminism is A vindication of the rights of woman, by Mary Wollstonecraft – 
a detailed bill of particulars contesting the exclusion of women from the regime of rights and 
property outlined in the political theory of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Wollstonecraft’s work 
epitomized the feminist debate of the Enlightenment and summed up its arguments. Thanks to its 
detailed programmatic presentation, it became literally the classic primer of feminism. 
Enlightened thought is profoundly practical. Given the existing state of affairs, it chooses to 
imagine the world as it should be and seeks ways of turning this ideal into a reality. This does not 
mean, however, that the Enlightenment itself is feminist. It is more as if feminism is the unwanted 
child of the Enlightenment. Rousseau, one of its principal theorists, considered that many of the 
differences that distinguish the sexes and which are assumed to be natural were merely the result of 
habits and lifestyles adopted by society. Thus, a robust or delicate temperament, or the strength or 
weakness derived therefrom, was deemed to be the result of the harsh or effeminate way in which 
the person was reared rather than a reflection of his or her primitive constitution. The same was 
true of the forces of the spirit.  
Without going into details, Rousseau said, it should be evident to all that in relationships of 
servitude, which were formed mainly because of the mutual dependency of human beings and the 
reciprocal needs that bound them together, it was impossible to be dominated by a man without 
first being in the position of not being able to do without him – a situation which, since it did not 
exist in nature, left each of them free, and therefore the law of survival of the fittest did not apply.1 
This radical philosopher, who did not even admit that force might be a factor contributing to 
inequality in the pre-social state, and who looked upon all subsequent privileges as unjust, went on 
to say that it was difficult to demonstrate the validity of a contract that obliged one of its parties to 
set everything aside but required nothing of the other. While on the one hand he regarded freedom 
as a benefit that no one had the authority to take away, on the other hand subjugation and exclusion 
of women were totally acceptable to him. 
Rousseauian democratism was exclusionist. Equality among males was based on their 
advantage over women. The ideal State was a republic in which every man was both a citizen and 
the head of a family. Women, regardless of their social station or their particular endowments, had 
no right to citizenship or freedom. With this line of thinking Rousseau set the stage for the feminist 
debate of the eighteenth century. Although he was a great intellectual, he was an outsider to the 
philosophical currents that prevailed in the salons of the time and felt no obligation to maintain 
even a feeble semblance of “gallant feminism.” For him, women were a second sex; their education 
should merely ensure that they fulfil their obligation to please, serve as helpmates and raise 
children. Neither books nor platforms were for them. The idea of freedom for women was odious 
and lowered the moral calibre of society as a whole. 
It may have been that once upon a time, in remote pre-civilian days, the two sexes were 
approximately equal. But the custom of cohabitation had given rise to the sweetest sentiments 
known to humankind – namely, conjugal and paternal love. Each family was a small society which 
was most united when its members were bound only by mutual commitment and freedom. It was at 
                                                     
1
  "Discours sur l’inégalité", Oeuvres Complètes, Vol II, L'Intégrale, Seuil, 1971, pp. 226-7. 
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that point that the first differences appeared in the lifestyle of the two sexes, which up until then 
had been the same. Women grew more sedentary and became accustomed to guarding the home 
and children, while men sallied forth and sought subsistence for the entire family.2 To guarantee 
this idyllic state, Rousseau the pedagogue explained in book V of Émile that in terms of sex, 
women were equal to men: they had the same organs, the same needs and the same faculties; the 
machine was built the same way, the parts were the same and they functioned in the same manner. 
As far as sex was concerned, there would always be relationships between men and women, and 
there would always be differences. It was these relationships and differences that governed the 
moral realm. As a clear result of this, experience had shown the uselessness of debates over the 
pre-eminence or equality of the sexes. Simply put, in that which was common between them, they 
were equal, but in that which was different they were not comparable. Men and women no more 
needed to be alike in their understanding than they were in their physical appearance. The former 
should be active and strong; the latter, passive and weak. It was indispensable for the one to have 
desires and power and sufficient for the other to not present much resistance. This principle being 
established, it could therefore be concluded that the particular destiny of women was to please men. 
Men’s power was their worth, and the fact alone that they were strong was pleasing. The man was 
the husband, and he was by nature pre-eminent over the woman. 
When I say that feminism can trace its birth to the Enlightenment and was its unwanted 
child, I am merely pointing out that it was the Enlightenment’s debate over the equality and 
differences between the sexes that gave rise to a new critical discourse based on the universal 
categories of the political philosophy of the time – a discourse that no longer compared men and 
women or their respective differences or advantages but instead compared the situation of women 
being deprived of rights and property against the universal declarations themselves. These 
declarations were drafted using the actual text and terminology of Rousseau, hence the importance 
of his views for understanding feminism as a political theory.3 Feminism was the first strong and 
significant correction to the democratism of the Enlightenment. Although it arose out of the 
previous phase of the debate, it was forged and solidified through contrast with political 
developments of the time – the American and French declarations of rights – and the political 
theories on which they were based. Precisely because Mary Wollstonecraft was a Rousseauian 
democrat, because she believed that his Du Contrat social [Social Contract] and Émile [Emilius] 
offered the ideal formula for setting up a legitimate State and providing the appropriate education 
for its new citizenry, she was not about to let women be excluded from that new territory. Only 
after the new socio-political paradigm had been fully accepted could there be any argument about 
its shortcomings. She understood perfectly well that all individuals must be free and have full 
command over their person and their rights, that they could not be guided solely by their own 
personal interest. They had to fulfil a social contract which was based on the general will of the 
people, but this general will did not coincide with the will of all, since it had normative elements of 
its own; if common objectives were to be allowed to prevail, each individual had to exercise self-
control, and ultimately, it was the State that had to assume responsibility for these common 
objectives and common benefits. Wollstonecraft could not accept that half of humanity should be 
excluded from this rational ideal on the basis of sex. For all these reasons, she was moved to draw 
up and publish her bill of particulars in 1792. Although Du Contrat social had been the model for 
the French Revolution, it was actually only a model in the making. Nevertheless, the exclusions 
that it called for were being respected point by point.  
The 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, dedicated to “the newly born 
generation,” was replete with expressions straight from Rousseau, whose ashes were being laid to 
rest with full pomp at the National Cemetery. Meanwhile, the Assembly was turning a deaf ear to 
                                                     
2
  Ibid. p. 229. 
3
  For this analysis, see Rosa Cobo, Fundamentos del Patriarcado Moderno: J.J. Rousseau, Cátedra, Madrid, 1995. 
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the “Annals of Complaints” sent by some women pleading for education, modest voting rights, 
reform of the family and protection.4 A Vindication of the Rights of Woman was not a lone voice. 
Widespread egalitarian sentiment, fostered by the Enlightenment, had already begun to stir before 
the French Revolution. The Vindication reflected the attitudes of many women who, usually by 
virtue of their birth and social station, had managed to have some cultural opportunities. It found a 
rapt audience in the political elite, who agreed with the author’s arguments and in some cases had 
also come out in favour of these ideas. In 1790 the Marquis de Condorcet repeated what had 
already been said in 1787: just as men have rights in their condition as sentient beings capable of 
reason and as possessors of moral ideas, women should have absolutely the same rights. Never, he 
pointed out, under any “free” constitution have women exercised the right of citizenship.5 
Despite the many editions that quickly followed the first appearance of A Vindication of the 
Rights of Woman in 1792, and despite the defiant language reflecting its politics of origin, it failed 
to make an impact beyond a few small intellectual circles.6 The same was also true of the much 
briefer Declaration of the Rights of Women and Female Citizens, published by Olympia de Gouges 
in 1791. This latter author, as a reward for her sharp pen and her fame, was beheaded at the 
guillotine two years later. Mary Wollstonecraft, for her part, was the object of ridicule and 
vilification. One can imagine the chilly reception she must have received, even in kindred political 
circles, judging from a pamphlet produced by one of the most radical groups on the revolutionary 
scene, which called for a law forbidding women to learn how to read.7 Of all the inventions and 
innovative proposals that were introduced in that political environment, feminism was among the 
ones that received the least support. The closest acknowledgment of women’s rights was contained 
in article XI of the French Revolution’s Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, which 
entitled some men and women to defend and express their beliefs and opinions freely, recognizing 
that this was one of the most precious rights of man. However, there was little more than that. 
Feminist ideas came up against a solid wall of prejudices, firmly instated in social and political 
practices. Rousseau helped to perpetuate this inertia and give it new respectability when, in 
addition to arguing for the entire exclusion of women from his genial vision of a new public realm, 
he also offered successful fecund models of femininity. 
Rousseau’s denial of citizenship for women, coupled with the adoption of this position as 
revolutionary policy, generated several forces simultaneously which led to secularization of the 
unequal treatment of women – precisely at the time when they were being delivered from outdated 
mythical and religious thinking. The political line of argumentation was derived from the moral 
line, and underlying them both was an unexpressed self-interest. Some of Rousseau’s arguments 
regarding the natural origin and basis for the exclusion of women have been cited above: all men 
were husbands and all women were wives; the family was the original society, and it was 
hierarchical; from this hierarchy flowed a number of effects. 
                                                     
4
  This unusual literature, which mixes accusations and complaints, is relatively unknown, as is almost the entire feminist debate of the 
Enlightenment. An excellent selection of introductory texts has been assembled in A. Puleo, La Ilustration olvidada: la polémica de 
los sexos en el siglo XVIII, Anthropos, Barcelona, 1993. 
5
  Condorcet, Lettres d’ un bourgeois de Newhaven à un citoyen de Virginie, Puleo, op.cit. p. 95. With regard to a woman’s right to 
citizenship, Condorcet made it clear that either no member of the human species had true rights, or they all did. 
6
  For a better understanding of the text and context, see I. Burdiel, in his excellent introduction to the Spanish-language edition of A 
vindication of the rights of woman, Madrid, Cátedra, 1994. 
7
  The author was probably Sylvain Maréchal, of the group “Les Egaux” [The Equal Ones], one of whose most famous members was 
Babeur. If it comes as a surprise that pure egalitarianism was compatible with the complete exclusion of women, this could be 
because of a lack of sufficent clues with which to interpret it. According to Celia Amorós, the notion of equality of citizens was 
totally eclipsed by the conspiratorial equality of the male fraternity (“Espacio de Los Iguales y Espacio de las Idénticas”, Arbor, 
Madrid, November – December 1987); the author revisited and expanded on this work in “Igualdad e Identidad” in El Concepto de 
Igualdad, A. Valcárcel, Ed. Madrid, Pablo Iglesias, 1994. For a detailed commentary on Maréchal’s satiric pamphlet, see G. Fraisse, 
Musa de la razón, Madrid, Cátedra, 1991. 
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The Rousseauian mould gave rise to a new model of femininity, which was sanctified, in the 
division of political roles. If women were not part of the public and political order, it was because 
they belonged to the domestic and private order. This separation and this concept of a second 
sphere were to remain the foundation and the condition of possibility for everything in the political 
realm. Women did not have the qualities of spirit – that is, the moral strength, which implies 
intelligence, honourability, impartiality – or the physical qualities, given their obvious corporal 
weakness, with which to pay the price of citizenship. Ruled by sentiment rather than by reason, 
they would not be able to maintain the necessary equanimity in the assemblies, and because they 
were weak physically, they would be incapable of defending their right to citizenship against 
others. Neither assemblies nor arms were appropriate for them. It was impossible to be both a 
woman and a citizen; the one excluded the other. This exclusion, however, did not constitute a 
withholding of rights. Rights could not be granted to those who did not need them. They were 
being denied by nature itself. Women were the pre-civic mass whose function was to reproduce the 
natural order within the State. They were not citizens because they were mothers and wives. 
The State was composed of males, who had responsibilities and rights and who contributed 
to edification of the general will and to the attainment of objectives of common interest. Women, 
bound as they were to a prior order, could not even think along these lines. Their inability to 
execute the contract that each individual makes with the general will arose from their situation 
within the family sphere, which was natural, rather than family-based or political. As a collectivity, 
they had to be kept under the real and symbolic authority of men: in the real order, they owed 
abnegation and obeisance to a specific man; on the symbolic level, they all owed reverence to the 
sex that was capable of maintaining the public order. While this might be interpreted as an unjust 
exclusion, it actually was not; quite the contrary, a clear-cut separation of spheres was important 
for the very good of those who were excluded. The familiar sex should not be burdened with the 
weight of public affairs. Given the nature of women, they could not endure the demands of public 
life, and they would inject their incapacity into serious matters and thus undermine the attainment 
of society’s objectives. In this separation there were no exceptions, nor should there be any. 
Although the “Geneva Manuscript” in Rousseau’s Du contrat social mentioned that in a free State 
men, often in groups, lived “gently” with women, he was later to retract this statement, which 
showed something about his desire not to unnecessarily provoke the salon culture. And in Discours 
sur l’origine de l’inégalité [A Discourse on the Origin of Inequality], the division of labour 
between the sexes appeared already in the dedication, where he asked: “Could I forget this precious 
half of the republic which gives happiness to the other, which keeps the peace with their sweetness 
and wisdom and preserves its good customs? Amiable and virtuous citizens, the destiny of your sex 
shall always be to govern ours . . . therefore, always be what you are – vestal guardians of the sweet 
connection to peace; continue to seize every opportunity to give value to the rights of the heart and 
Nature in the name of duty and virtue”.8 
In the first of these works, the separate existence of the sexes was claimed to be a necessary 
accompaniment of freedom, and in the second, a guarantee of peace. However, the fact that there 
were two spheres did not mean that two sources of authority were recognized. In the State, only 
males were entitled to equality and freedom. Legitimate hierarchies were allowed within the State, 
and males also retained the authority within the family – this from the same philosopher who 
refused to accept that any individual could barter or renounce his own freedom. It must be 
understood, however, that “the individual” for all intents and purposes was male. Elsewhere 
Rousseau wrote that the difference between men and women was infinitesimal yet significant. 
There were many reasons, he said, based on the nature of things, why the father should rule the 
family. First, the father and mother should not have equal authority; one of them should govern, 
                                                     
8
  Ed. cit. p. 208. From Manuscrit, ibidem ,422 
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and when there were differences of opinion, there should be a dominant voice that made the final 
decision. Second, however mild the particular inconveniences of womanhood might be, they 
always entailed a period of inaction, and that in itself was reason enough for her not to have 
primacy, because in a balance that was perfectly equal, a single straw could tip the scales. 
Moreover, the husband should have the right to inspect his wife because it was important for him to 
know that the children he was forced to recognize and feed were not fathered by anyone but him. 
The wife, who had no similar concern, did not have the same right as the husband in this regard.9 
This line of thinking pushed Wollstonecraft to the brink of rage. At times her prose was withering, 
especially when she lamented the bitter fate of those women who had no protector or resources 
with which to take care of themselves. Women who were denied the use of their abilities, she 
claimed, became dependants or victims – they were forced into a dependency that subjected them 
to the whims of an individual who had almost total right over them. While that situation in itself 
was already deeply saddening, what enraged her even more was that those who were denouncing 
all forms of servitude were nevertheless willing to maintain the oppression of women. While the 
likes of Rousseau were dreaming of higher goals for humanity on the one hand, on the other hand 
they were still trying to prevent women from breaking free of the destiny that had been imposed on 
them.  
Wollstonecraft refined the Enlightenment’s discussion of the sexes by using of universal 
political categories drawn from rational Natural Law. At the same time, she took a critical look at 
the feminine condition, from which she concluded that many of the behavioural and temperamental 
traits considered to be characteristic of women were in reality a product of their lack of resources 
and freedom. From her Enlightenment perspective, she refused to accept that male superiority was 
anything but an unearned privilege reinforced by prejudices passed down since time immemorial. 
“I do not mean to allude to all the writers who have written on the subject of female manners – it 
would, in fact, be only beating over the old ground, for they have in general written in the same 
strain; but attacking the boasted prerogative of man – the prerogative that may emphatically be 
called the iron sceptre of tyranny, the original sin of tyrants, I declare against all power built on 
prejudices, however hoary.”10 The situation of women had no origin other than abuse of the power 
on which the order of inherited nobility was based, and that, she vowed, must be overturned. Both 
denominations, class and sex, were political, and it was impossible to be against one of them and 
leave the other intact. What men exercised over women was not a natural authority – there was no 
such thing – but rather an unjust privilege: “if it proved that this throne of prerogative only rests on 
a chaotic mass of prejudices, that have no inherent principles of order to keep them together, . . . 
they may escape, who dare to brave the consequence, without any breach of duty, without sinning 
against the order of things.”11 Giving the modern name of privilege to the ancestral hierarchy 
between the sexes was a radical theoretical innovation, which the early feminism of the 
Enlightenment sought to oppose. This could be done, thanks to the conceptual and discursive 
categories of Modernity, but only by going beyond the uses for which these categories were 
originally intended. Feminism had emerged as an unwanted child of the Enlightenment. It called for 
subverting the established order, and very few people wanted to see that happen. The movement 
seemed to threaten the very pillars of the new bourgeois respectability. It appeared that refusal to 
accept the notion of pedigree, on which the privilege of inherited nobility was based, meant that it 
was necessary to establish a new form of family in which the sexual hierarchy was basic. It meant 
redefining the roles of man and woman. 
                                                     
9
  From the article “Economía política,” ed. cit., p. 277. In this regard, I cannot resist mentioning that Rousseau, as certain as he was 
that he was the father of the children he had with Thérèse, did not feel obligated to recognize or support them; he himself admits in  
his Confessions that he sent them all,  one after the other, to the hospital for foundlings. 
10
  Vindication, p. 249, Spanish ed., Cátedra, 1994. 
11
  Ibid. pp. 249-50. 
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I have said that the new model of femininity can be traced to Rousseau. In La Nouvelle 
Héloïse [The New Héloïse] and Émile he created a model of womanhood that was sensitive and 
maternal. E. Badinter examined the creation of this woman-mother model and the consequent 
abrogation of such prior practices as mercenary child-rearing, wet nurses, and leaving children at 
hospitals for foundlings.12 According to the model, every man was conceived, as a virtual pater 
familias whose higher purpose, on a par with others, was to configure the general will in the form 
of the State. Every woman, in turn, should exist and be prepared for the purpose of being a wife. 
The public realm corresponded to men; the private, to women. As Hegel pointed out in his 
Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts [Philosophy of Right], each generation, apart from the 
talents and abilities of individuals, had a destiny that was determined at birth. “Complementarity” 
became the watchword, and it excluded symmetrical justice. It was neither convenient nor desirable 
for the sexes to neutralize their defining characteristics; rather, they should be emphasized. That 
was the way to guarantee order. The sexes were not equal; they were complementary. That was the 
way of Nature, and the new socio-political order should not go against its will. Feminism claimed 
that male domination was a political construct. The response to that claim was to neutralize it by 
giving each sex its own principles of action and excellence.13 But underneath the pretence of 
complementarity was a deep division: one part of humanity was culture – ideas, habits, concepts, 
institutions, rites, rationality, in short, everything that differentiated humans from the other species 
– and the other part was Nature – absolute identity which reproduced itself and maintained itself. In 
that fundamental division, the men were culture and the women were Nature. The destiny of 
women was, and should continue to be, to perpetuate the species. To paraphrase Rousseau:  women 
should continue to be what they already were. It had always been thus, and there was no reason to 
alter that destiny. It was not the will of any one individual that women should be as they were, but 
rather an immemorial decree of the world. With all the changes that were taking place or might be 
desirable in the human realm, including a new politics that was the highest expression of spirit and 
reason, still there appeared to be no reason to amend the statute that governed the entire collectivity 
of women.  As Hegel was to insist later on, they had to be kept in their own order, the 
undifferentiated bosom of Nature, regardless of their particular abilities and talents. If in the deep 
nucleus of humanity there was a division between Nature and Spirit, women were Nature, and 
therefore what took place in their lives was neither political nor the consequences of unjust 
privilege. That world should never be regarded as part of the political realm, nor should any 
attempt be made to enlighten it, much less change it. 
To recapitulate: the early feminism that emerged from the debates of the Enlightenment 
managed to formulate its demands in a political key, with two pillars, the virile concept of 
citizenship and the new definition of femininity, and herein was the beginning of an exclusionist 
democracy. Once the revolutionary moment was over, its two main concerns were to implement the 
new Napoleonic Code of civil and penal law and to institutionalize the bourgeois educational 
model. 
We use the term “Napoleonic Code” generically to refer to the new forms of positive law 
that replaced the old piecemeal order of law based on such notions as caste, trade and estate. 
Universality was adopted as a standard principle and Roman law as the model. The haphazard 
mosaic of ancient laws was replaced by a homogeneous civil code and a penal code made less 
                                                     
12
  Badinter, E. ¿Existe el amor maternal?, (1980) Span. trans. in Paidós, Barcelona and Buenos Aires, 1984 edition cited here. 
13
  Badinter notes that it was not mere chance that the first women to hear men discourse on the subject of maternity were from the 
bourgeoisie. Neither poor nor especially rich or brilliant, the women of the middle classes saw in their new role an opportunity for 
advancement and emancipation that aristocratic women were not looking for. The mother became the central basis of the family and 
was hailed as a “domestic sovereign,” while maternity became a gratifying function because it was now elevated as an ideal. In a 
vocabulary borrowed from religion, the “noble function” of motherhood became associated with a new mystique. The mother was 
compared to a saint, and her natural patron was the Virgin Mary, whose life was a testament of devotion to her son. Badinter, op. 
cit., pp. 183-84. 
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harsh by the enlightened principles advanced by Cesare Beccaria. Using Roman law as the basic 
model, the new civil codes consecrated women’s status as perpetual underage minors: they were 
regarded as daughters or mothers in the charge of their parents, husbands – even their sons. They 
had no right to manage their own property, decide upon or abandon their domicile, exercise 
parental authority, practice a profession or be gainfully employed without permission, nor could 
they reject a violent father or husband. Obedience, respect, abnegation and sacrifice were their 
obligatory virtues. The new penal code, with its provisions against such crimes as adultery and 
abortion, enshrined the belief that their bodies did not belong to them. In the end, no woman was 
her own person because they were all denied what citizenship ensured – namely, freedom. 
Moreover, the institutionalized educational curriculum in the new society also excluded 
women. The new liberal State assumed responsibility for education and established the levels that 
we now refer to as primary, intermediate and higher education. The educational curriculum became 
the key that opened the door to the professions. Changes were made to the university system; the 
degrees granted by the institutions had to be certified by the State. The State also regulated the 
intermediate level and had its own system of centres and school officials. Even primary schooling 
was formalized and ceased to depend on the family or unregulated teaching. The State became the 
judge and guarantor of what a person knew or did not know and of their competency in terms of the 
curriculum. Women were formally excluded from the intermediate and higher levels, while primary 
schooling for them was merely “allowed.” 
Without citizenship and excluded from the regular educational system, women were entirely 
outside the realm of liberal rights and goods. Securing these, obtaining the vote and gaining access 
to institutions of higher learning became the objectives of suffragism. 
Feminism as liberal suffragism.  The second wave 
The nineteenth century brought consolidation of the liberal socio-political model, though not 
without some setbacks and opposition. Despite attempts to restore the old order, Napoleonism and 
the budding industrial society had so significantly changed the picture that not even the most 
nostalgic were able to maintain their intent to return to the former system. When the powers met at 
the Congress of Vienna and assumed the commitment to reinstate the earlier moulds and mutually 
support the restored monarchs against revolutionary uprisings, they knew that it would be virtually 
impossible to stand by their agreement.14 Liberal principles gradually became accepted, as did the 
models of political alternation. The political theory that underpinned this early liberalism was an 
amalgam of abstract Rousseauian principles and the solid elaborations of theory of State advanced 
by Benjamin Constant. The separation of the public and private spheres, of family and State, which 
had been the basis of the Rousseauian concept of the State, was completely accepted in the liberal 
political philosophy. Early liberalism regarded the citizen as a pater familias and drew on the 
notions of social contract and general will. The latter notions were rejected and attacked by the 
conservative ultramontane tradition, but the former was upheld by all the authors. 
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind and subsequent Philosophy of Right reflect the accepted 
sentiment of the time:  the abolition of pedigrees was good because the nobility could become 
masters of the State. On the other hand, he preferred not to look upon the State as a contract, and 
even less did he think that matrimony should be regarded in those terms. The family was the 
guarantee of order, and within the family, the separation of the sexes and their functions was the 
ultimate and immutable foundation of ethics. 
                                                     
14
  There was actually only one intervention. “Los Cien Mil Hijos de San Luis" [The Hundred Thousand Sons of Saint Louis]” were 
called up in Spain by the ultramontane Ferdinand VII to fight the Spanish liberals. They withdrew, disgusted by the type of violence 
he expected them to take part in. The outcome of this intervention ruled out any possibility of engaging in another one elsewhere. 
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Romantic misogyny 
Understanding Rousseau’s ideas about what men and women had the right to expect from the 
body politic was essential to understanding the developments that took place in the nineteenth 
century. Rousseau, author of the Du Contrat social, was attacked, but he stood alongside the 
Rousseau who was not attacked – the one who had decreed that there were two immiscible realms: 
the political and spiritual, which corresponded to men, and the natural, which corresponded to 
women. This division of the world had been dictated by philosophy, and an explanation is in order. 
Today feminism tends to look to philosophy as an ally, but this is no different from 
associating philosophy with misogyny. By this I mean to say that philosophy in and of itself may 
not necessarily be liberating – a fact that was amply demonstrated throughout the nineteenth 
century. When the Enlightenment overturned the religious discourse that validated female 
inferiority as a prelude to justice, it also overturned the religious arguments that women had 
inherited the expulsion of Eve from the Garden of Eden and that their inferiority was retribution by 
Divine Justice for the original sin committed by the first woman. However, the determination that 
sustained these arguments had not lost its force, and hence new arguments were sought to justify 
the exclusion of women. Old Mother Eve was not sufficiently convincing in a world of technical 
progress, telegraph, railroads, anaesthesia and free trade. She had served her purpose, and new 
explanations of greater substance were needed; philosophy was to provide them. 
Obviously it was possible to continue excluding women, but not without awareness that the 
discordant voices of early feminism – Wollstonecraft, Gouges, Condorcet – had spoken. In 
opposition to these, and to the hopes that they had raised, albeit in very small circles of opinion, the 
monumental edifice of romantic misogyny was erected. The only referent for this whole new way 
of seeing the world was Rousseauian thought, and its purpose was to re-argue the reasons for the 
exclusion of women. Thus philosophy took over the role once played by religion in validating the 
world, as it already existed, endowing it with even harsher aspects than it had had before. 
The philosophers that I refer to in the chapters I devote to romantic misogyny in La política 
de las mujeres [The politics of women] are no second- or third-string players lurking in the recesses 
of the history of philosophy. Those who advanced theories on why women should be excluded 
were among the great minds of the nineteenth century: Hegel, Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, 
Nietzsche – figures whose names evoke immediate recognition even among those who are not 
experts in the field. The sound of these names is associated with well-deserved respect, for these 
eminent thinkers held undisputed influence over everything that had to do with the development of 
new discourse in the scientific, technical, and humanistic areas:  medicine, biology, all the sciences 
that emerged during nineteenth century, psychology, history, literature, the plastic arts – they all 
drew upon the ideas of one or another of these philosophers. 
The first to address the reconceptualization of the sexes was Hegel, but he was not the most 
influential:  he was an obscure philosopher, his terminology was complicated and what he did say, 
he said with too much gentility. In his Phenomenology of Mind he declared that the sexes were a 
reality of life and the natural world, but that in the human species they were dictated by norms. 
Each had its own destiny. The destiny of women was the family; that of men, the State. That 
destiny could not be contradicted. What we understand as the history and dynamics of human 
communities is really how the two sexes relate to one another. Although each of them had a 
destiny, it was not a biological one. For Hegel there was a political/ethical dimorphism, which was 
what made for the two separate spheres. That distinction went beyond the contingent qualities of 
the individual. In other words, if an individual conformed to what is preached about the entire sex, 
that was all to the good; otherwise, the normative standard would have to be imposed on that 
individual as the truth. The truth was that which applied to the entire sex to which he or she 
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belonged, not the qualities or character traits that the particular individual brought to the world. In 
any case, sex was a public destiny for men and a private one for women, and any attempt on the 
part of the latter to subvert this order was to invite ruin upon their communities. 
As I have said, however, Hegel was too complicated. The philosopher whose undisguised 
misogyny set the tone for the nineteenth century was Schopenhauer. Unlike Hegel, he expressed 
himself with great fluidity and in terms that anyone could understand, and he was therefore a major 
influence. Anyone in the mid-nineteenth century who was reasonably “cultured” kept 
Schopenhauer’s works at his bedside. Parerga und Paralipomena [Essays from the Parerga and 
Paralipomena] went beyond philosophy to offer ideas on literature, politics, medicine, and other 
areas as well. Indeed, it could be said that Schopenhauer’s thought informed all that was thinkable. 
And of course, his misogyny was an essential aspect of his thought. He made no attempt to hide it. 
Moreover, he added something significant to Rousseauian and Hegelian theory: not only was the 
male sex the incarnation of spirit and the female sex the embodiment of Nature, but the 
fundamental characteristic of nature was the perpetuation of Nature. And this was worth a lot. 
The feminine, broadly speaking, was Nature’s stratagem for reproducing itself. Actually, 
thanks to a spiritualist distortion, the term feminine has been used to refer to what should properly 
be called female. Nature herself was female. She ought to perpetuate herself because this was her 
only purpose; she did not and could not have any ulterior teleology. Nature was unconscious and 
therefore had no awareness of herself. This unconsciousness – this absence of intelligence, 
deprivation of purpose, inability to express ideas or look to the future or reflect on the past – was 
indeed a pure existence devoid of any self-awareness. And since the female was a continuity 
throughout Nature, it followed that a cow, a bitch, a hen and a woman actually shared much more 
than man and woman, who were of the same species in appearance only. What separated women 
from the human species was precisely the fact that they were females. Although their speech, 
comportment and adherence to norms might sometimes suggest that they were human beings that 
was pure appearance. True wisdom lay in being able to look more deeply and see that this apparent 
human being was really no more than the manifestation of Nature’s stratagem for self-perpetuation. 
The exquisiteness of this being was false and utilitarian: the sole purpose of its beauty, grace and 
glimmerings of intelligence was reproduction – witness the fact that those features disappeared as 
soon as reproduction was taking place. While men acquired maturity, women bloomed and faded. 
Nature used and abused them. This philosophy became the topic of discussions in coffeehouses, 
and indeed there was nothing in its basic texts to prevent it from being well received in those 
places. Schopenhauer vaunted the popular misogyny and its various subtopics, giving it an 
imposing and respectable appearance. All women were woman – ultimately, female – and none of 
them were entitled to the treatment that would be given to a second sex. What disgraced European 
cultures, compared with wiser ones such as those of the Orient and Islam, was the pretence of 
individuality accorded to women out of stupid gallantry. The European woman was futile and 
ridiculous, and by all logic she should be made to disappear, because women belonged in the 
harem. Women, the anaesthetic sex, should be shielded from self-will and all knowledge. Yet 
another of Schopenhauer’s many absurdities, by way of conclusion, was his claim that it was a 
stratagem of Nature that women should constantly seek a man who would assume legal 
responsibility for them. In other words, it would appear that Nature had assumed a juridical role. 
Be this nonsense or not, Schopenhauer was one of the strongest pillars in the formidable edifice of 
romantic misogyny. 
One may wonder why such formidable armaments were mobilized against the vindication of 
equality, which had only been proposed in elitist circles. Romantic misogyny was able to gain the 
foothold that it did precisely because its proponents feared that feminism could become a force that 
could render all of society uncontrollable. We all know what fear is, and societies know it as well. 
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Our worlds feel threatened by change and react by defending themselves against it. Romantic 
misogyny was mobilized to stave off the second great wave of feminism – namely, suffragism. 
The Seneca Falls declaration 
There were few protests against this new order, and the few that there were came from lone 
and strident voices. Without education and without any power, few women could afford to take up 
the political or moral defence of their sex. The same was true of men, who were already committed 
in the political realm and could not afford to turn their attention to any woman other than the one 
invented by early romanticism. There were a few voices like George Sand and Stendhal, on the one 
hand, and on the other hand, the romantic feminine figures of perfect innocence. In the political 
arena, there was the systematic confrontation of liberals and ultramontane conservatives – and, 
emerging under their feet with no one even noticing it, a nascent workers’ movement. 
In 1848 Europe was severely shaken by a new revolutionary process that was getting under 
way in several countries simultaneously. It should be noted that some of the European nations had 
almost totally escaped the Enlightenment; romanticism was the first cultural movement to blanket 
the entire European map. Society in the first half of the nineteenth century was more homogeneous, 
more synergistic, than it had been in earlier times. 
The year 1848 was one of ferment and public declarations. While the Communist Manifesto 
is often remembered, far less attention has been given to the declaration signed at Seneca Falls, 
New York. Although the latter was produced on the other side of the Atlantic, its repercussions 
were ultimately felt in all industrial societies. In 1848, seventy women and thirty men from various 
liberal movements and political associations came together at Seneca Falls and adopted a 
“Declaration of Sentiments.” 
The Seneca Falls declaration was modelled after the American Declaration of Independence. 
Its twelve resolutions were organized around two central themes:  first, women’s attainment of full 
citizenship in civil society, and second, a set of principles oriented towards the transformation of 
customs and the moral realm.15 The group that met at Seneca Falls came mostly from abolitionist 
circles. These men and women, who had devoted their lives to the abolition of slavery, came to the 
conclusion that there was more than just parallelism between slavery and the situation of 
presumably “free” women. Inspired by the postulates of Natural Law and John Locke, along with 
the belief that human beings were born free and equal, they declared that “all laws which prevent 
woman from occupying such a station in society as her conscience shall dictate, or which place her 
in a position inferior to that of man, are contrary to the great precept of nature and therefore of no 
force or authority.” The “great precept of nature” they were referring to may be summarized as the 
right to equality, liberty and the pursuit of personal happiness. This was the same precept that had 
been invoked against the trafficking, sale and ownership of slaves. While sentiment in favour of 
abolition grew stronger in England, to be soon followed by the open condemnation of slave traffic 
and ultimately its prosecution, the abolitionist movement was also gaining momentum in the United 
States. The most conscious groups, even though their victories were meagre, decided to include 
feminine servitude on their list of wrongs to be righted. This happened because the majority of their 
members were women activists. Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott, the de facto movers 
behind the Seneca Falls Declaration, together formed the vanguard of what came to be known as 
the suffragist movement. These two women, who were later to compile and edit the classic text on 
suffragism, Woman’s Bible, made their struggle public with this declaration.16 
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Suffragism was an international movement and its presence was ultimately felt in all 
industrial societies. It focused on two specific objectives – namely, the right to vote, and the right 
to an education – and it achieved both within a period of eighty years. In other words, at least three 
generations of militants engaged in this struggle, and at least two of those generations never lived 
to see the fruit of their labours. 
The two campaigns, the one for the vote and the other for education, advanced in parallel and 
mutually supported each another. As the requirements for male suffrage changed, even the most 
familiar misogynous arguments could no longer conceal their shocking nature. At first, men who 
had a certain amount of revenue could vote, but women in the same circumstances could not. Then 
the vote was given to men who earned their livelihood, but not to women, even if they were 
employed. And finally, all men won the right to vote, yet all women, regardless of their status, were 
still excluded. The right to education would play a major role in the changes that were to come.  
As the first step, some females were given the right to primary education based on the 
rationale that such schooling was consistent with the domestic canon: a knowledge of reading, 
writing and arithmetic was necessary in order for a woman to adequately fulfil her role as wife and 
mother. Such a petition, so consonant with domestic submission, could not be turned down, and 
primary schools for young girls were created under the guise of preparing them for their feminine 
duties. Not long afterwards, women’s groups began to demand admission to the intermediate levels 
of instruction, invoking an argument that was also consistent with the prevailing model: it might 
happen that some women, while fully aware that marriage and maternity were their destiny, could 
be faced with adverse circumstances that prevented them from fulfilling it: orphanhood, lack of an 
adequate dowry or some other unforeseen misfortune might preclude a matrimonial life for a 
number of women with the best intentions. Would it not be a good idea if such a woman could 
subsist by practising some worthy profession, rather than having to depend on her family, or, even 
worse, falling into disgrace? Cast in terms of ensuring their virtue and proper discipline, the new 
proposal of schooling, first for teachers and then for nurses, was presented and, again, it had to be 
accepted. Nursing was nothing but a social extension of a private feminine virtue – namely caring 
for those in need. The same was true of teachers. Was it not more reasonable for young girls to be 
educated by women than by male teachers, who, with higher expectations, could undoubtedly be 
imparting greater knowledge to young boys? And from the standpoint of decency, was it not more 
seemly for women to instruct young girls and extend their maternal capacity to the education of 
prepubescent boys? Indeed, up to the present day these two professions continue to be dominated 
by women. It was these early teachers and nurses who prepared the way and made it possible for 
middle-class women to enjoy a relatively free existence. However, there was still one more hurdle 
to surmount, and that was the most difficult of all:  the institutions of higher learning. 
Once they had gained entry to primary education and some of the intermediate vocations, a 
select group of women emerged who were able to meet the requirements for admission to the 
universities. Would the doors of these institutions remain closed to them? Let us take the 
pioneering case of Concepción Arenal and the university system in Spain. This woman, without 
doubt one of our greatest jurists, applied for admission to law school, encouraged by a family of 
academic leaders who had confidence in her exceptional brilliance. After sufficient pressure was 
exerted, it was decided to admit her. However, the characteristics of this admission said a lot about 
the obstacles that existed for women who attempted to pursue a university education. She was 
allowed to audit classes in the law school as long as her presence in the hallowed university halls 
was not “indecent.” What this meant was that she was obliged to attend classes dressed as a man. It 
can only be assumed that that proper and God-fearing society considered transvestism less 
threatening than the idea of a woman hearing teachings, which in principle were forbidden to her! 
The routine was as follows: accompanied by a member of the family, Doña Concepción would 
present herself at the door of the law school, where she was received by a warden, who would 
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escort her to a room where she had to wait alone until the professor in the subject to be presented 
would come to get her and take her to the class. Seated apart from her other classmates, she would 
follow the lecture until it concluded, at which point the professor would take her back to the room 
until the next class. With consummate patience, Concepción Arenal put up with these rituals and 
completed her studies in law. However, for women, completion of the course of study signified 
nothing more than that they had attended the classes; they were not entitled to a degree, much less 
allowed to practice the profession that their studies had prepared them for. Thus many women who 
pursued university studies during the second half of the nineteenth century, and even up into the 
1920s, were listed at graduation time as having completed the course of professional study but were 
never granted a degree. In fact, sometimes they were required to explicitly renounce that right.17 
Starting in 1880, a few of the European universities began to admit women to their 
classrooms. The rationale was that it was being done on an exceptional basis. This was apparently a 
case of the familiar expression “the exception proves the rule.” It is well known, however, that if 
there are exceptions to a rule or a regularly observed phenomenon, then it is not really a rule. If all 
of ‘x’ is ‘y’, then the fact that there is an ‘x’ which is not ‘y’ invalidates the former proposition. But 
that is another kind of rule. The rule here was that higher education was unacceptable for women 
but that exceptions could be made. The fact that there were exceptions confirmed that the rule was 
well formed. A woman with a higher education was not, and could not be, an ordinary woman, and 
therefore her abilities and her work spoke for her alone and in no way altered the opinion held 
about the rest. She was an exception and the others were as their nature made them. Under this 
“dynamic of exceptions,” some women succeeded, for the first time, in creating a space for 
themselves within the formal culture. Lou Andreas Salomé, Marie Curie and others of a similar 
calibre came from this generation of exceptions. 
It should be kept in mind, however, that even though the granting of degrees began to be 
more common thanks to these “exceptions,” it did not mean that women had the option to practise 
the regular professions. The first women to obtain degrees were denied entrance to the professional 
colleges of physicians, jurists and professors, which was why the early generations of women with 
higher education went into research. Excluded by law and custom from the professional careers, 
they found their niche in scholarly investigation. Thus, the exclusion of women from the 
professions, at a time when research could still be carried out almost alone or in small teams, made 
for some of the first women Nobel laureates. 
The difficult road to education intersected with the one leading to political rights. As select 
groups of women expanded and grew in number, it became increasingly difficult to deny them the 
right to vote. The suffragist movement took advantage of this tension in other parts of the world as 
well. Throughout the second half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth 
century the suffragists consistently stepped up their program of meetings, conventions, public 
statements and demonstrations. Political democracy owes the suffragist movement a debt of 
gratitude both for the word “solidarity” and for the modern-day methods of civic activism. The 
word “solidarity” was chosen to replace “fraternity” because the latter’s root frater had clearly 
masculine connotations. Today we never use the phrase “liberty, equality and fraternity” except to 
refer to the historic triptych of the French Revolution. “Solidarity,” the term coined by the 
suffragist movement, has become commonplace. The movement’s methods of civic activism have 
been even more far-reaching. Suffragism introduced intervention strategies into politics starting 
from the perspective of women’s exclusion. The strategies had to be appropriate for persons who 
were not inclined to be violent and had relatively little physical strength, and so they devised 
methods such as peaceful demonstrations, the heckling of speakers, hunger strikes, human chains 
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  Three years ago the British press ran a feature about an Englishwoman celebrating  her 100th  birthday who received two presents: 
first, like every centenarian in England, a congratulatory telegram from the Queen, and second, a diploma from Oxford University, 
where she had studied history and had not been allowed to hold a degree when she was young. 
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and inflammatory pamphlets, all which are now in widespread use. Today this is seen as the normal 
way to carry out the fight for citizenship – no assaults, fires or barricades. Suffragism pioneered 
these methods of non-violent demonstration.18 Suffragist parades became processions of women 
dressed in academic gowns with diplomas in hand, marching behind banners which demanded the 
right to vote. 
The theoretical political foundation of suffragism had been laid down by Harriet Taylor and 
her husband John Stuart Mill. The latter’s exhaustive reform of early liberalism provided the 
theoretical framework that made it possible to consider non-exclusive citizenship for the first time. 
His contribution was primarily the redrafting of Natural Law and a deeply individualistic ontology 
that found its social articulation in the notion of common interest rather than the general will. 
Equipped with the solid doctrine of the second wave of liberalism, suffragists were able to demand 
and obtain the basic liberal rights of voting and education. Feminism has yet to lose any of the 
battles in which it has engaged. Although it may have been relatively slow in achieving its results, 
it has never wavered in its objectives. Fulfilling the twin demands of suffragism took at least eighty 
years, but the struggle was ultimately successful. In some countries and states, women won the 
right to vote around the time of World War I; by the end of World War II, all countries that were 
not dictatorships recognized that its female population had this right. 
This victory was not unrelated to the two great wars that broke out during the first half of the 
twentieth century. Men were called up and sent to the front, and the belligerent countries then had 
to turn to women to keep manufacturing and the war industry going, not to mention government 
and its subsystems. The economy did not collapse, production levels were maintained and public 
administration managed to deal smoothly with numerous critical situations. It became clear that 
women were capable of keeping the country going. There was no reason to deny them full 
citizenship. Not even the most misogynist voices could oppose their demand for the vote. Instead, 
these misogynists limited themselves to predicting the catastrophic effects that women’s new 
freedom would have on family relationships. The suffragists had been wrong, they said, or had 
misled themselves with their frequent assurances that this new freedom would not affect the family. 
It was possible that many of the militants sincerely believed it would not, but the picture that 
developed as a result of their activism ensured that indeed it did. 
The long suffragist struggle – a struggle to win public favour and improve the position of 
women in education and the labour force – had lasted for almost a century, and now it had finally 
come to an end. The benefits of freedom had been achieved, and both suffragism and romantic 
misogyny had run their course. Things were different now. Or were they? 
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  I do not know why this fact is often ignored and the origin of peaceful resistance is attributed to the purportedly peaceful ancestral 
roots of the Hinduism of Mahatma Gandhi. The truth is that Gandhi borrowed it from suffragism. 
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II. The feminine mystique 
In democracies that came into being after World War II, for the 
first time there was universal suffrage and guaranteed education for 
the entire population. That meant the beginning of a new era for 
women – an era made possible thanks to the rights won by the 
suffragists. An enormous contingent of female citizens had 
opportunities available to them that had been unheard of in the past. 
What happened then was the emergence of a coordinated 
campaign based on what came to be referred to as “the feminine 
mystique.” The governments and the mass media, with a newly 
expanded role nearly as impressive as what they have today, embarked 
on the conscious mission to both remove women from the jobs they 
had held during the war and send them home, and at the same time, to 
diversify production in the plants that had been devoted to the war 
effort. Betty Friedan, in her book The Feminine Mystique, which was 
to become the launching platform for the feminism of the seventies, 
offered a masterful analysis of the various trends of the time. In the 
1950s, women with the hard-won right to vote and finally with 
educational opportunities were being forced to return to the hearth and 
resign themselves to a domestic life. This literally meant renouncing 
their newly acquired rights. The men returning from the front 
demanded to have their old jobs back, thereby displacing the women 
and obliging them to return their traditional role. It was argued that the 
jobs belonged to the men, who had been obliged to give up their jobs 
temporarily because of force majeure.  
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In order for this to happen, the home itself had to be reinvented and the traditional role of 
women had to be updated to take the new state of affairs into account. Large numbers of women, 
with their recently won citizenship and elementary or high school education, had to be satisfied 
with being housewives. 
Women were being summarily expelled from the jobs they had taken on when they replaced 
the men who went to the front. They were being asked to give up their jobs through a campaign of 
optimistic dissuasion in which the women’s magazines played an active role. 
Women’s magazines had made their debut in the Roaring Twenties, and by the 1950s they 
had gained their present broad-based readership and circulation. They proposed a new female 
model in which modern women were distinguished from their ignorant and worn out grandmothers. 
“Then” and “now” became the catchwords. “Then” their grandmothers did many things 
thoughtlessly and no doubt incorrectly because of their lack of education and opportunities: they 
didn’t know how to raise their children, observe proper hygiene, and so forth – in other words, they 
didn’t know that running a household required a degree in home economics. “Now” modern 
women were citizens and had an education; they were free and capable – free to choose to stay at 
home and not compete in the tight labour market; capable of running the home with business-like 
planning. The contemporary home, in which electrical appliances freed women from some of the 
more onerous and humiliating chores, required a domestic engineer to run it – a woman who knew 
that success depended on proper management of the family enterprise. Every homemaker was a 
managing director and the success of the nuclear family depended entirely on her. It didn’t make 
sense to go out and compete on the labour market for a job that required low or average 
qualifications when she could be her own boss. And the “modern woman” not only had to keep her 
technologically up-to-date home in perfect order; she also had to establish relations that could 
promote her husband’s career: meetings, clubs, dinner parties and other special occasions fuelled 
the engine of family progress. 
The models of womanhood changed not only in ads and magazines but also in the movies. 
The independent unmarried woman of the 1950s was countered by the likes of Doris Day. On 
television, which was having a steadily growing influence, the ideal woman, even when she could 
choose to do anything, decided to be a homemaker, as seen in such notable examples as the highly 
successful series “Bewitched” – a perfect composite of them all. The protagonist is not a gnarled 
old witch like her mother but rather a doting wife who willingly renounces her powers and lives 
vicariously through the professional life of a pleasant but mediocre husband. 
Simone de Beauvoir’s seminal feminist work, Le deuxième sexe [The Second Sex], had 
appeared just before this propaganda campaign got under way. This philosopher, daughter of “the 
dynamic of exceptions,” had applied her considerable talent to going about feminism in a new way. 
It was no longer a question of vindication, as it had been for the women writers during the 
Enlightenment and for the suffragists, but rather a matter of explanations. It is difficult to 
categorize the work of de Beauvoir: one always wonders whether to consider her the last word for 
suffragism or the beginning of the third wave of feminism. In any event, she appeared during a 
vacuum between the two, just at the time the feminine mystique was being concocted. Moreover, 
she belonged to cultural elite, whereas the model of womanhood proposed by the mystique was for 
the average woman. So the feminine mystique continued to operate within the “dynamic of 
exceptions.” The new domestic model foreshadowed women’s return en masse to the old 
dichotomy of public vs. private, this time not based on Nature but conceived as complementary. 
Undoubtedly some women might object to such a destiny, but they should give it a try. If it turned 
out to be untenable, they would be regarded as exceptions. Beauvoir herself writes that she 
believed in good faith that she was an exception. It was like believing in good faith that only in the 
Capitalist world were women treated unfairly and that equality had already been achieved in the 
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Soviet State. The feminine mystique coincided with the Cold War and was one of its defining 
features; just as there were two socio-political models, there was also two models of womanhood. 
The reality, however, was quite different. In the West, the feminine mystique had triggered a major 
reaction in the female population it was attempting to convert, while Soviet “equality,” for its part, 
functioned only with extraordinary effort, which was required exclusively of women, while 
domestic work remained unchanged and public freedoms were still suppressed. 
If the model was difficult for the exceptions, since it usually entailed spinsterhood, strict 
sexual morality and almost unbearable emotional moderation, for those who attempted to adapt to 
it, it was equally repugnant. The nuclear family was no longer a production centre; it had become a 
consumption centre. At first the emphasis on natality – not unexpected after a war, when there is 
always an upsurge in births – took up the available time of the new homemakers, but not without 
any letup on the demands for perfectionism, placing excessive pressure on family relations. 
“Modern women” was required both to work and to please, and she was often torn between the 
two.19 Homemaker clubs were the only political niche that was available to them, and they had 
little chance of playing a role in the community. The way to keep the average educated woman with 
a high school education and certain professional aspirations at home, even though it was a 
technologically up-to-date home, was to occupy her mind with compulsive personal and domestic 
tasks, and the way to satisfy her desire for participation was for her to attend meetings about the 
best ways to can food, or get involved in buying and selling cosmetics at home – and all this was to 
have personally disastrous consequences. With no economic independence and no relevant 
domestic tasks or prospects for relationships or a cultural life outside the suggestions advanced in 
the magazines, women lapsed into a domestic vacuousness – fostered all the more by technology 
and even, in the upper income brackets, by paid domestic help. At first they frittered away their idle 
time on handiwork, romance novels and television, but eventually they fell into loneliness, 
depression and those syndromes dismissed as “typically female” ailments. 
By the mid-1960s it became abundantly clear to the daughters of this generation that the 
conquests of the suffragists had only succeeded in bringing about changes in the male hierarchy. 
Their restlessness began to increase, and individual channels for venting it could not be found. A 
new movement was about to come into being. 
The feminism of 1968. The third wave 
The feminine mystique of Betty Friedan 
The phrase capsulized the model of womanhood that was being promoted by post-war 
politics, and it opened the eyes of the new generation of women. It gave a name to the “nameless 
malaise” – the term used by the feminists of the 1970s to refer to the mental and emotional state of 
deprivation and discontent, the stale air and lack of horizons, that appeared to infuse the world they 
had inherited. The earliest feminists of the 1970s were quick to come up with a diagnosis: the 
patriarchal order had remained intact. “Patriarchy” was the term chosen to refer to the social, moral 
and political order maintained and perpetuated by the male hierarchy. It was a social, economic and 
ideological order that sustained itself by self-supporting practices, with no regard whatsoever for 
the rights those women had recently won. 
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The political niche in which the third wave of feminism was born was the 1968 
counterculture of the Left. Just as the feminism of the Enlightenment had seized upon 
contemporary political categories and suffragism had enlisted (and updated) the terminology of 
liberal politics, the third wave of feminism adopted conceptualisations from contemporary politics. 
It remains to fully explore the change in political conceptions that informed the uprising of May 
1968, or even to understand what the movement actually represented. What it did do was form a 
new elite, replacing the one that had emerged after the Allied Victory; propose a new design for the 
Welfare State; launch a revolution in the communication of knowledge; bring about profound 
changes in lifestyle, and chart a new Utopian horizon based on a different set of values. Since we 
continue to live in the midst of these changes, it is still difficult to understand them fully. 
The feminism of the 1970s brought the end of the feminine mystique and set the stage for a 
series of changes in values and lifestyle that are still taking place. Its first major accomplishment 
was the recognition that, even though political rights had been won in the form of the vote, access 
to education had been gained and women were taking their place in the professions (albeit with 
explicit prohibitions in some areas),20 they had not yet attained a position of parity with men. There 
continued to be a hierarchical distance and a difference in the degree to which they were valued, 
which in some way was accepted as legitimate. This recognition prompted an analysis of the 
situation and the identification of new objectives to be achieved. 
It was determined with certainty that winning the vote had failed to bring about any 
legislative changes as far as much of civil and family law was concerned. The non-legal, normative 
realm – i.e., morals, modes and customs – had scarcely undergone any change. It was therefore 
urgent to examine existing legislation with a view to making it egalitarian and equitable. Equal 
rights would be in appearance only unless they were codified in the form of new legislation. This 
third wave of feminism was not content with the right to vote; it embarked on a systematic review 
of each and every existing law with a view to detecting and eliminating the legal roots of enduring 
discrimination. 
In all the advanced countries, in the 1970s, when the feminist protests were at their height, 
revisions and legal reforms were introduced that enabled women to truly exercise their freedom, 
which until then had only been granted to them in the abstract. But the feminism of the 1970s was 
not prepared to stop there. From the outset it had sought to undo the inherited normative order in its 
entirety, not just the strictly legal aspects. This was accomplished by incorporating into the 
juridical realm areas, which up until then had been regarded as private.21 Feminism was erasing the 
traditional boundaries between private and public. 
The bulk of the legislative work was completed within a decade – the 1970s through the 
early 1980s. But the third wave of feminism was also determined to effect changes in the non-legal 
and non-explicit normative spheres as well. The revolution in morals, modes and customs – the 
triad that we usually refer to as mores – was taking place at the same time as the legislative reform. 
What was most notorious and created the greatest scandal were the new judgments about female 
sexuality and the new sexual freedom of “liberated” women. Whether or not premarital relations 
were more common than they had been before, what was important was that the women who 
engaged in them refused to feel guilty or be censured. The availability of contraceptives, 
intrauterine devices, spermicides and “the pill” (widely marketed and used semi-legally) gave 
women in the student advanced guard unprecedented power over their lives. 
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exceptional basis. 
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  For example, the idea that rape could occur within the marriage was unthinkable when it was first proposed. 
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The change in mores was taking place partly through momentum, independently of the 
militant nucleus. For the militants, “abolition of the patriarchy” and “what is personal is political” 
were their two principal themes. The first was the overall objective, and the second was a new way 
of looking at politics, not as management but rather in contractual terms. A much broader 
interpretation of politics, albeit somewhat more elusive to deal with, came to prevail: namely, that 
politics includes everything that involves a relationship to power. This interpretation, drawn 
directly from the philosophy of the Frankfurt School, particularly via Herbert Marcuse, and later to 
be supplemented with elements from Michel Foucault, made it possible to return to the deepest and 
most classic theme of feminism since its very beginnings: unjust privilege. But now the analysis, 
despite the broader scope of the term politics, was becoming more explicit. The new data and 
contributions of psychoanalysis, cultural anthropology, sociology – in sum, the current panoply of 
contractual political culture – permitted diagnoses that once would have been unforeseeable. The 
new feminist philosophy was being shaped, as Kant would have it, by elevating the particular to the 
level of a category. 
Kate Millett, Sulamith Firestone, J. Mitchell, C. Lonzi, each in their own way, undertook to 
memorialize the painstaking work of the women everywhere who had come forward in response to 
the idea that “what is personal is political.” Those primitive groups literally pooled their personal 
experiences so that they could be carefully examined and discussed.22 Laboriously, even painfully, 
their members began reweaving, with the threads of their individual lives, the entire tapestry of 
their shared oppression. From these early labours, reworked in the prevailing political language of 
the countercultural of the Left, arose the leading works of the period: Millett’s Sexual Politics, and 
Firestone’s Dialectic of Sex. 
As the analyses went deeper into detail and broader in scope to include a wide range of 
situations – the law, the workplace, the mass media, education, health, sexuality, intimate 
relationships– de Beauvoir’s Le Deuxième Sexe [The Second Sex], buried under 20 years of 
neglect, also began to take on importance. While it certainly had not been articulated in an 
immediately political language, in its own way it gave convincing explanations for some of the 
phenomena that existed worldwide. It became the first step of feminism into the “philosophy of 
suspicion,” and soon this latter philosophy was added to the previous ones, though not without 
certain reservations. The reservations were greater among the more radicalised groups, which 
embraced Valerie Solanas’ S.C.U.M. Manifesto: Society for Cutting Up Men. 
In any case, the movement as a whole was seen from the outside as a radical, and sometimes 
incomprehensible, protest, both because of the kinds of demands that were being made and because 
of the way in which they were presented. And this was not just in conservative circles; tensions 
began to mount among the travelling companions themselves. The “unwanted child of the 
Enlightenment,” which with suffragism had become the uncomfortable kin of liberalism, was now 
being regarded as the unexpected and undesirable ally of the 1968 movement. But now, just when 
the protesters were on the verge of reaching the Utopian paradise and overturning the “system,” 
what was the point of women still revolting? Didn’t they realize that they were fragmenting the 
movement just as it was entering the final struggle? 
Already accustomed to working within the dynamic of exceptions, even the most extreme 
politicians attempted to divert the momentum of this headless force. As far as the theorists were 
concerned, with the prior issue of “the principal contradiction” for practice, they turned to 
deceptive tactics in an effort to win the women over. “Why do you need to be a feminist?” was a 
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question they often heard by women. The implication was that feminism was for the incompetents; 
“real” women could gain access to the radical elite without such baggage. 
As the direct descendant of egalitarianism, feminism has always had an inner tension 
between the rank and file and the leadership. This has often caused the movement to fall into what 
has come to be referred to as “the tyranny of lack of structure.” Indeed, feminism itself is such a 
basic form of egalitarianism that the movement’s collective action sometimes gets in its own way. 
The feminism of the 1970s, which had attracted impressively large numbers of women, had 
confidence in the novelty of its demands and in its ability to stir up unrest, but it had almost no 
leadership and often did not even want it. The groups came together either through affinity to the 
cause or through friendship, and they operated on the basis of this ethically and politically directed 
amity, which may best be characterized by the Greek word philia. This way of forming their ranks 
was entirely appropriate, given the nature of the discourse and the experiences that had to be 
addressed in the initial phase. To elevate the anecdotal to the level of category sometimes meant 
revealing personal and even intimate things, and this was facilitated by the support of the philia. 
However, both the diagnosis and the formulation of objectives were political. Yet they were 
attempting to make an impact in the public realm from a space that was being constructed as 
semiprivate. At the same time, feminism also sought to transform each militant into a unique 
liberated woman. In the jockeying for a position in the hierarchy, which did not take long to appear, 
a small elite group of women emerged who had not been endorsed by their male counterparts and 
did not come from the established male network, and these women believed in direct political 
dialogue. By themselves, they hoped to bring about the desired changes on all matters regarding 
which the politics in power was prepared to yield. 
Thus there arose the question of whether it was a single or dual militancy,23 complicated by 
the fact that the leadership just mentioned was emerging in groups with a similar dual commitment 
as well as in others that were focused on a single cause. In this way, feminism was forced to 
address the subject of power. These tensions, however, should not distract us from the main issue: 
even in the midst of the confusion, the identification of symptoms, the diagnosis and the 
formulation of objectives continued advance apace. By the 1980s, feminism, albeit very timidly, 
had begun to take its place in formal politics. Agencies specifically devoted to the situation of 
women were being created in all the Western countries, and for the most part they made it possible 
to complete the work under way on legal reforms and to evaluate the laws already in place. 
In the 1980s it became clear that in the world’s social image the masculine side continued to 
connote power, authority and prestige, and that the reforms achieved to date had not made a 
significant impact on this inertia. Thus the objective became visibility. In other words, the 
profoundly anti-hierarchical and egalitarian movement of feminism had to face the problem that it, 
too, was becoming a theory of the elite, and it had to try not to lose its identity while dealing with 
it. This was an important factor in the development of tension between equality and difference. 
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III.  The present and the challenges 
for the future 
Just as the suffragist victories were followed by the feminine 
mystique, the 1980s saw the development of a conservative backlash 
which attempted to put things back the way they had been and close 
off the avenues opened up by the new legal spaces. This happened 
during the conservative administrations of Reagan and Thatcher, so 
ably described by Susan Faludi in her Backlash: The Undeclared War 
Against American Women.24 Again the strategy consisted of a 
synergistic orchestration by the public powers, the media industry, the 
trend-setters and the conservative network of civil society. However, it 
had much less impact than its predecessor. On the one hand, the 
international panorama was not as homogeneous; on the other, 
feminism in the 1980s was being reduced to a mass of unfocussed 
individual actions.  
While in some countries an effort was made to suppress the 
agencies responsible for equality, or else restructure them so that they 
would be supportive of a conservative model of womanhood, in other 
countries, with a different political orientation, the small 
representation of women in their public agencies gained increased 
visibility through quota and parity systems based on positive 
discrimination. Internationally, feminism, which had always been an 
international movement, was making its mark in places where it had 
previously been unthinkable – the developing societies – and it was 
embodied in “gender” practices, which had never existed before, thus 
claiming for the first time a role in the building of democracies.  
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The feminism of the 1980s and the 1990s found in the quota system a tool that enabled 
women to become more prominent at the heart of the public sector, where studies showed that 
previously the social visibility of women had been interrupted because there was no place for their 
new skills and positions in the explicit or legally established authority. This spelled the end of the 
dynamic of exceptions. 
It became urgent to conduct quantitative reviews. Exercises were undertaken to find out how 
many women were employed in each of the major sectors and why there were so few of them. The 
conclusion was that there was a “glass ceiling” in all the hierarchical and organizational scales: at 
the upper levels of the ladder, the presence of women with equivalent preparation got smaller. The 
conviction grew that selection mechanisms were impartial in appearance only.25 It was therefore 
considered important to promote measures that would ensure the presence and visibility of women 
at all levels – in other words, to implement positive discrimination and quotas. 
In this area the best results have been obtained so far in the public sector. It remains a 
challenge to implement this type of action in private industry, which would entail rather broad 
political and trade union agreements. Both mechanisms, positive discrimination and quotas, are 
natural tools that democracies use when they decide to improve their egalitarian balance sheet,26 
and for this very reason they tend to fall outside liberal or ultraliberal contexts. Quotas are 
instruments for ensuring that members of systematically preferred groups are placed in selected 
positions; in other words, they impose a meritocracy when the normal recruitment procedures are 
not sufficient. Positive discrimination, on the other hand, attempts to impose impartiality from the 
outset rather than at the end; similar individuals may be treated differently so that some of them can 
have a slight advantage from the beginning of the competition. 
The feminism of the 1990s found itself turning to the study of organizational dynamics. This 
does not mean that the themes of general political philosophy had been abandoned, but rather that 
there was a need to shed light, using increasingly refined instruments, on the micro-politics of sex. 
The analyses looked at the real nodes and points of power, the economic and relational forms, the 
image one projects, the ability to handle authority, etc., and gave rise to highly detailed and 
informative studies.27 Thus feminism became all the more complex by continuing to be, in essence, 
an egalitarianism which was at the same time a theory of the elite – in other words, global activism 
turned into clever political theory. 
The challenges for the new millennium 
In order to accede to feminism’s demands for parity, it seems clear that the current 
theoretical framework, which is still naturalist in its broad outlines, will have to change. The 
naturalism that existed on the ideological map at the end of the last century undoubtedly came from 
the Enlightenment, as a reaction to the spiritualism that that went before. It has been around long 
enough to have changed its face several times, assuming such forms as Positivism, Eugenism, 
socio-biologism, etc. However, it is not part of the current landscape of global ideas and concepts 
in the modern world simply because it offers better explanations for certain phenomena than the 
earlier spiritual explanations; the naturalism of today is above all the foundation and outgrowth of 
current social practices, as amply demonstrated by Mary Douglas.28 If there is sufficient dissent 
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over such practices – for example, in the case of those that ensure sexual hierarchy – we at least 
have a good reason to expect the ultimate decadence of naturalist reductionism. At present, 
however, it is still an important component of modern cosmogony, and a great conceptual effort 
will be required in order to change it radically, much less leave it behind.29 If the global framework 
continues on its drift toward dialogism and hermeneutics, the possibilities that have already opened 
up will be expanded. 
With regard to the political societies within the framework of globalization, it is clear that 
opportunities and freedoms for women tend to be greater wherever overall liberties are guaranteed 
and the State takes responsibility for ensuring adequate minimums. Feminism, which since its 
origin has been a form of democratism, relies on the guarantees of democracies to achieve its 
objectives. Although in extreme situations the active participation of at least some women in civil 
conflicts would seem to advance their cause, in reality gains there from are only consolidated in 
free and stable situations. Many women have learned the hard way, with their own flesh, that 
risking life and limb to overthrow a tyranny does not prevent them from suffering the consequences 
of their victory if the new regime that follows is yet another tyranny. Any totalitarianism and any 
fundamentalism will tighten social control and, unfortunately, this means above all else more 
stringent normative control of the female collective as well. Thus the outward signs of a victorious 
insurrection – changes in clothing and customs, defence of family values, moral “housecleaning,” 
etc. – are always significant and should never be dismissed as mere accidental details. Montesquieu 
once wrote that the measure of freedom that a society enjoys depends on the freedom enjoyed by 
the women in that society. Only democracy – the more so to the extent that it is deep-rooted and 
participative – ensures the exercise of freedoms and the enjoyment of acquired rights. However 
imperfect it may be, it is always better than any kind of dictatorship, whether it is social, religious 
or charismatic. In a democracy the channels for the resolution of demands have to be kept open and 
therefore they are presented in public – although this may not necessarily bring immediate 
agreement. This is a prerequisite for viability and consensus. Rights acquired in a situation of 
tyranny are easily lost – an indication of the limited consensus that had been reached. Precisely 
because no necessary historical law governs social events, involutions are always possible and 
nothing is certain forever. Democracy is a political form that must be constantly defended and 
refined, and this may be done from any number of sources, individual or associative. Increasing the 
flow of participation – which involves the encouragement of questioning, debate and the 
elaboration of final arguments – always favours public presentation of the cause of those who have 
been excluded. Feminism, democracy and economic industrial development work synergistically, 
so that even the appearance of explicit feminism in societies that had not had it before is an 
indication that they are on the road to development. Feminism is committed to the strengthening of 
democracies and it also tends to strengthen them. 
Admission to the circles of explicit power continues to be the task at hand. Quota systems –
formal in some political contexts and informal in others – have helped to ensure that all rosters 
include more women than would have been admitted in a process of normal, biased recruitment. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
stabilizing principle, which usually involves the naturalization of social classifications. This is achieved by the systematic 
application of an analogy. When the analogy is applied from time to time, going from one set of social relations to others and from 
these again to nature, its formal structure becomes more easily recognizable and ends up becoming a self-validating truth. Or 
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Despite their defects, and they clearly have them,30 they should continue to be applied precisely 
because so far it has not been possible to ensure impartiality through the usual mechanisms. 
The purpose of quotas is not to put women in places where there are none – that would be 
positive discrimination – but rather to prevent the regular recruitment process from exercising any 
bias with regard to sex. The explicit and legitimate power, whose primary analogy is political 
power within democracies, is important for achieving the aim of visibility. It exposes the true 
quality of the progress made toward the attainment of educational objectives. Suffragism, in its 
struggle to gain educational rights, managed to cover the most important and decisive stretch of the 
road toward parity. Visibility only attempts to ensure that this hitherto unthinkable event – namely 
equal education and women’s accomplishments measured in terms of their merit – is not 
systematically obliterated and swept under the rug as if nothing had changed. Quotas put an end to 
two recurring patterns that perpetuate male privilege: discrimination in recognizing achievement 
(making women’s achievements invisible) and discrimination by the elite. 
Feminism is also internationalism, and has been since the beginning, in that it has applied the 
universal principles of the Enlightenment in both senses: as a broad movement and as 
political/moral universalism. In the context of globalization, this means that feminism should enter 
into three fields of action. It should engage in the debate on multiculturalism. It should seek to have 
a presence in international organizations. And it should be open to the possibility of rapid and 
effective international action. 
Multiculturalism, which basically accepts differences between cultures and the right to 
demand respect for this difference, when it allies itself with communitarianism, may attempt to 
rationalize and legitimize certain social forms of oppression and exclusion which feminism has had 
to struggle against in the past. To give its support to multiculturalist positions, feminism can and 
should make certain that these positions are in keeping with the list of minimum conditions set 
forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, if possible, supplemented by the declarations 
currently being considered on the rights of women.  
The presence and visibility of women should also be increased in the international 
organizations, as should the capacity of international women’s bodies, both partisan and general, to 
take action. Experience with international conferences, declarations and forums would indicate that 
there is willingness for women to have a presence in the complex process of globalization, as well 
as a voice in the formulation of general objectives in the areas of ethics, politics and population 
policy. The presence of feminism in international institutions also ensures that gender-based 
technical assistance programs are appropriate and effective. At a time when nations are no longer 
the appropriate framework within which to solve many problems that have worldwide ramifications 
and are beyond the scope of action by individual States, contributions to the endowment, 
improvement and empowerment of international institutions are, in effect, contributions to the 
overall cause of women’s liberation. 
The matter of rapid and effective international action is also tied to the thorny question of 
violence. Women are not essentially committed to peace. Although a philosopher as perspicacious 
and enlightened as Simone de Beauvoir has referred to males as the sex that kills and females as the 
sex that gives life, this is really the kind of rhetoric that only a certain differentialist mystique could 
take as serious. However, although women may not be essentially pacific, or even functionally so 
in a patriarchal hierarchical system (because a woman uses her capacity for violence with those 
who are weak, even among the same sex, and because her atomized disposition obliges her, 
regardless of her wishes, to support the violence of her men), in an impartial society they have 
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nothing to gain from violence. In applying the ethical principle of majorities to decisions that 
sometimes can and should entail violence toward the outside, states must suppress internal violence 
as much as possible. Moreover, even if they do manage to avoid political and civil violence, their 
responsibility for action has not ended, for they are also obliged to protect their citizens against 
their own capacity for mutual violence. In other words, they have the duty to be safe, because the 
easy life can only hope to flourish when the external and internal violence of the State does not 
take up too much space in the collective imagination. The conservative Roman historians used to 
say that peace “feminizes” a population. That conclusion, which was meant as a criticism, is now a 
firm conviction in advanced democracies. The values that peace promotes – namely, shared 
community life, caring for others, enjoyment of pleasures – are not essentially feminine; they are 
aspirations common to all societies that can afford to allow for them. I will refrain from further 
exploration of this matter here because it is too important a subject to be dealt with in brief. But I 
will at least say that feminism can constitute a guarantee of peace because it is totally committed to 
the elimination of gender-based violence and individual violence. Women can freely take up arms 
in the military, while at the same time feminism can collectively demand to have a society that is 
pacific and internally disarmed. In those communities in which value is still given to the capacity 
for violence, little value is accorded to women, and they are its victims. 
Most of the lines of present and future action that have been mentioned so far can be reduced 
to one of following three types: calls for change in the conceptual framework, development of 
increased capacity for action and reparation of quantitative deficits. In conclusion, I would like to 
propose some immediate objectives the fulfilment of which would help to clear the real hurdles that 
are blocking the road to parity. I will list at least three of them. The first would be to correct the 
qualitative, as well as the quantitative, deficit. While discrimination by the elite produces a 
quantitative deficit, in itself it is a qualitative deficit – and currently an especially serious one. 
Given the present level of schooling of the female population, their massive failure – and the early 
data from the previous decade leave no doubt about this – could not have occurred without an 
express will for it to happen and the operational will to ensure it. The glass ceiling remains firmly 
in place in all professional areas. 
The second objective would be to expose gynophobia in the business world and deactivate it. 
As subjects, women are in the worst situation in the labour system – which would appear to be 
indifferent – with fewer opportunities, worse jobs and duties often beneath their individual 
capacity. The second part of this objective would be to introduce the merit system for women over 
30 who are subjected to constant and not-so-subtle discrimination like no other women have 
experienced in the past. This generation, which has made the greatest achievements and attained 
the highest education rates in history, is currently experiencing a genuine disaster. 
And third, there is still a critical need to develop common will. Feminism is more than a 
theory or a movement; neither is it clever politics. It is, and has always been, I would like to say, at 
the risk of repeating myself, a mass of actions, some of which may have seemed minor and of little 
significance. Every time a woman has individually opposed an inherited hierarchical guideline, or 
increased her prospects for freedom from prevailing practices, she is making another infinitesimal 
moral step forward. Feminism has been, and still is, a sum of rebellions, affirmations and actions 
against the prevailing tide, which many women have been and continue to be engaged in without 
having any idea that they are feminists. In other words, these actions are taking place without any 
awareness of common will. 
I believe that at this moment, in this third wave of feminism setting the stage for the third 
millennium, women may already be capable of forging a common will that is relatively 
homogeneous in its overall aims: namely, to protect what has already been achieved and to 
continue progressing toward the attainment of their freedoms. Regardless of their place on the 
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political spectrum, today’s women who are in the public eye have the duty and the capacity to 
develop an agenda of agreed-upon minimum objectives. If they press forward and create this 
common will, women will be able to reach their goals with much less effort – even if only on the 
emotional level – than their predecessors had to make in order to achieve what they have today.  
I believe that every generation is responsible for its own phase, and those of us who are 
benefiting from what other men and women have already achieved for us will in turn be responsible 
for our own. Ahead of us lies the great challenge of parity, which will mean resolving several 
smaller challenges:  the formation of a well-articulated common will that is aware of both its 
memory and the goals that it is pursuing; the exposure of sexist (if not gynophobic) practices in 
civil society, the marketplace and politics; joint development of an agenda of minimum conditions 
that would prevent any loss of what has already been achieved and strengthen new gains as they are 
made; and finally, redress of the qualitative deficit which is currently a shameless affront to reason. 
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